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indicate external relations, the appetites are specialized to disclose internal states. Indeed, the appetite for food, as a means of enjoyment, so closely unites itself with taste and odor, as to yield with them a compound gratification incapable of practical analysis. The return in most of the appetites is at measured intervals; in others the spaces are more irregular. According to this definition, the desire for sleep is an appetite. Hunger and thirst are impulses recurring more fixedly; sexual appetite, one that is renewed less certainly.

An appetite in its first action, as yet neither gratified nor denied, is indicative; and indifferent as regards pleasure and pain. It is, indeed, the condition of the pleasure which is to arise from indulgence, but is itself hardly either a distinct enjoyment or a declared annoyance. One or other of these, however, it quickly becomes, according as its intimations are accepted or withstood.

Different appetites may be suppressed and modified with very different degrees of success, according to the purpose they subserve in our physical constitution. One is as imperative as the wants it indicates; another is, in the position it holds, very much the product of intellectual and moral forces. The appetites are physical indications and guides of action, and, in their healthy indulgence, uniformly give pleasure; in their denial, or excessive indulgence, as uniformly inflict pain. The pleasures and pains which accompany them are, carefully watched and collated, safe guides of action. They are, nevertheless, far from being sufficient, automatic forces, securing the results of physical well-being. While they are at first direct stimulants and immediate restraints, they are chiefly, in the human constitution, operative through a wise election and pursuit of pleasure, a sagacious avoidance of evil. The brute and the rational constitution seem to show an important distinction