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space of physical events. The peculiar nature of knowing, feeling, willing, is not understood till the idea of consciousness is present: yet these facts remain in their integrity possessed of all the elements that analysis discloses in them, without accrediting any one quality to consciousness. Consciousness thus shows itself to be to the inner, invisible world, what space is to the outer, visible one; the condition of its existence, the only canvas on which its colors can appear. To occupy space is to have physical existence, to occupy consciousness is to have an intellectual existence, to occupy neither is not to exist, is to present no one of the known forms of existence. The idea is seen to be regulative in the large class of propositions which arise under it. I know; I see the book; I feel the pain, are of this sort. Each of them is comprehended by virtue of the notion of consciousness, which expounds their several predicates.

This view also finds support in the difficulties which attend on the ordinary explanations of consciousness. What is it? is a question that has greatly perplexed philosophy, and has seldom received a very definite answer. Some have striven to conceive it as a faculty, yet this faculty must be present in the action of every other faculty, and that other faculty would be absolutely null and void without this. To divide an act of knowing into one of knowing, and one of consciousness, each taking a distinct moiety, is impossible. Hamilton has said, "Consciousness is the genus under which our several faculties of knowing are contained as species." But our faculties of knowing, no more require it than those of feeling and willing; and what exactly is a genus in distinction from the species it contains? Nothing but a word. Certainly an effort to make definite this view, prepares the way for regarding consciousness as a general idea, under which all specific acts of mind, in themselves complete, find recognition. J. J. Murphy,