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therefore afford the best ground on which to meet the opposing views. The affirmation is, that in the presence of sensations, perceptions, the mind comes at some moment to say, These are; or, involving another idea, that of causation, to say, The object occasioning them is. When this act of mind does take place, there is proof in it of a double activity aside from that of the judgment an activity furnishing the perception, and a second activity supplying the predicate. Can the judgment be made without both of these conditional activities? Can the three be resolved into two, or one? We answer, no. The judgment can do nothing with a naked sensation. It is to this higher faculty, lumber without tools. The sensation can yield nothing but mere feeling. Feeling, as feeling is complete in itself, and may as well repose in the sensational structure of an oyster, as in that of a man. The judgment alone can add nothing to that which it is to handle; for if it does, you therein assign it a double office, that of reason and judgment, that of calling forth the predicate, and of coupling it with the antecedent.

A sensation and the notion of existence involved therein, or better, evoked thereby, are very different. I see no reason why the one may not be experienced indefinitely without, in and by itself, giving rise to the other. Indeed we, with our rational powers even, are constantly enjoying or suffering sensations without affirming, or thinking of their existence. This notion is present only as the mind from time to time is brought directly to contemplate them. There is no latent judgment of their existence in clearly experienced, but not definitely thought of, sensations, in any other way than that the mind may, at any moment, have its attention directed to them, call them before itself for contemplation, and then be led to affirm their existence, under this mode of regarding them. A cloud is above the earth,