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as parts of sensation, as Spencer, Mill, and others affirm, will be further seen in a later discussion. In this class, then, of judgments, which are statements concerning single states of consciousness, it is evident that a regulative idea is united to a phenomenon, and the content of the lower organ, so to speak, taken up into the intellect. To this class also may be added those judgments in which the same idea, as existence, place, time or number, is affirmed of several phenomena; and we have our first division of judgments, those which directly unite to facts a regulative idea.

Lesson 40 - 12. Judgments, classes of - p.166

12. Another form of judgment unites two distinct objects under a regulative idea. Of this character is the statement, This apple is like that apple. Under the notion of resemblance, two objects, the products of distinct sensations, are united. Here the thought-process consists in bringing the two together under a comprehending form or rational notion. It is to this kind of judgment, that Bain and Spencer would analyze all thought, omitting even here the essential feature of the act, that a notion is intuitively seen by the mind, under which the movement goes forward. A sensation is complete and independent in itself, and does not necessarily lead to any farther state of mind. This it may or may not do according to its connections. In reflex action, so-called, an inward current, that may not affect consciousness, is followed by a physical force, by an outer motor current. This inward movement may, as a sensation, enter consciousness, and may thence go forth in certain, involuntary, automatic actions; or, as a sensation, it may be taken into the processes of thought, be merged in the intellectual movement, and reappear as a voluntary act, a new and independent impulse. Now the sensations occasioned by the presence of two apples, may simply and directly, as in the case of a brute, draw forth