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ordinary sense perceive, the existence of the external world. If an act of perception, as such, gives us the "non-ego," we find no occasion for an act of judgment to do the same thing.

The actuality and externality of the phenomena are already present as a fruit of perception. Does not the difficulty lie here, that Hamilton has given to perception a task impossible to it, and then, in later analysis, for a moment forgetful of previous assertions, has made it to involve a judgment, thereby easing it of its burden, though at the same time losing the distinction between these two acts of mind 3 The simple content of a perceptive organ is knowable, for perception is a power of knowing. It is not, however, while it remains in the sense simply, thinkable, because thought is an additional action of judgment, nor is it wordable, because words are the instruments of thought and imply it. The only confusion here arises from the fact, that the above assertions apply rather to the primitive data of perception than to its acquired elements. These have been added as the products of judgment.

A very limited and objectionable statement of that in which judgment consists, has been much dwelt on by Herbert Spencer, and distinctly enunciated by Alexander Bain. "What is termed judgment," says he, "may consist in discrimination on the one hand, or in the sense of agreement on the other: we determine two or more things either to differ, or to agree. It is impossible to find any case of judging that does not, in the last resort, mean one or other of those two essential activities of the intellect." The Sense and the intellect p. 329. Says Hamilton: " What I have, therefore, to , prove is, in the first place, that comparison is supposed in every, the simplest act of knowledge: in the second, that our factitiously simple, our factitiously complex, our abstract and our generalized notions, are all merely so